Methodology
Every chapter is built from a pinned revision of the bitcoin/bips repository. The current source is
commit 3a10b5b,
read on 1 October 2026. A lock file records each file’s hash. Links in each chapter open the
exact lines that support a statement.
Some BIPs publish their test vectors in other repositories. Those files are fetched at an explicit commit and hashed too:
- trezor/python-mnemonic/vectors.json at
b57a5ad, cited by BIP 39 - bip32JP/bip32JP.github.io/test_JP_BIP39.json at
5a43706, cited by BIP 39 - bitcoin-core/qa-assets/unit_test_data/script_assets_test.json (pinned excerpt) at
0739b29, cited by BIP 341 - bitcoin/bitcoin/src/test/data/tx_valid.json; bitcoin/bitcoin/src/test/data/tx_invalid.json; bitcoin/bitcoin/src/script/script.h (pinned excerpt) at
f490f55, tests for the reference implementation linked by BIP 112
What has been checked
Every exact value in a figure comes from a tested model, computed at build time or in your browser. The
models use @noble libraries for hashing, elliptic-curve arithmetic and ciphers. The block-filter
model uses the siphash package for SipHash.
The model tests
and figure tests
compare published material with the implementation and add selected edge cases. The table lists what each
model checks and where it stops. Passing these checks is narrower than full protocol conformance.
| Chapter | Published material | Additional checks | Limits and supplied values |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mnemonics BIPs 39 | All 24 English and 24 Japanese BIP 39 reference vectors, from entropy through words to seed. | Checksum failures, entropy sizes, Unicode normalization cases and the pinned English and Japanese wordlist hashes. | Public examples only; passing vectors does not establish the safety of a recovery phrase or wallet. |
| HD wallets BIPs 32 | All 17 BIP 32 derivation chains and 16 invalid extended keys; master keys from the 24 English BIP 39 vectors. | Public/private derivation agreement, hardened boundaries and parent-key recovery from a non-hardened child secret. | Key derivation and disclosure demonstrations; no payment-server security or wallet recovery audit. |
| Wallet paths BIPs 44, 84, 86 | BIP 44’s 16 example paths and BIPs 84 and 86 root, account, receiving and change-address vectors. | Invalid path conventions, derivation from account xpubs, and an explicitly illustrative account-discovery storyboard. | Derivation conventions and a discovery illustration; no chain scan or complete recovery of account funds. |
| BIP 85 BIPs 85 | BIP 85's vectors from its published root key: test cases 1 and 2, the DRNG bytes, 12, 18 and 24 English words, the HD-seed WIF, XPRV, HEX, Base64 password and dice outputs. | Path rules (BIP 85 purpose, every level hardened), each application's parameter ranges, and different outputs for different indexes and word counts. | English word lists only; the Base85 password, RSA, RSA-GPG and Nostr applications are not modelled. Public test vectors only: it never handles a real root key. |
| Addresses BIPs 173, 350 | Every Bech32, Bech32m and SegWit address vector in BIPs 173 and 350, including invalid-case rejection stages. | Checksum edits, witness-version and program-length boundaries, and program-to-character round trips. | Encoding validity does not establish ownership, balance or a safe destination. |
| BIPs 321 and 21 BIPs 321, 21 | The 21 URIs in BIP 321's URIs and Invalid URIs lists, read as the BIP labels them, and its five proof-of-payment examples, including all four published callbacks. | Percent-decoding, case-insensitive keys, the empty-body rule, the amount format, keys under the wrong HRP, and three illustrative wallets that implement different keys. | Reads addresses and invoices by form only, as BIP 321's examples are deliberately invalid; it never validates checksums, resolves payments or opens callbacks. |
| P2SH BIPs 16 | Three spends from BIPs 143 and 174: legacy 2-of-2, wrapped P2WPKH and wrapped P2WSH, replayed with signature checks. | Redeem-script mutations, push-only rules, signature order, witness-stack rules and BIP 16 sigop counting and the 15-key, 520-byte arithmetic. | Reviewed script forms and signature-hash modes only; unsupported opcodes and witness forms raise scope errors. |
| BIPs 67 and 48 BIPs 67, 48 | All four BIP 67 vectors (sorted keys, redeem script, P2SH address) and every path in BIP 48's examples table. | All six orders of a three-key set built without sorting (six different addresses), byte-by-byte comparison of neighbouring keys, refusal of uncompressed keys, and BIP 48's hardened and normal levels. | Builds scripts and addresses from public keys only: no key derivation for BIP 48 paths, no witness-script (P2WSH) addresses, and no signing. |
| BIPs 66 and 146 BIPs 66, 146 | Both ECDSA signatures in BIP 143's signed native P2WPKH example: strict DER, low S, and verified, input 1's against the published digest and input 0's against the computed legacy digest. | BIP 66's fourteen checks in order, with computed changes (R's pad removed, a zero added to S, a wrong length byte) failing at lines 84, 101 and 62; S replaced by n − S still verifying but failing LOW_S; txid and wtxid after each flip. | Encoding and LOW_S checks on single signatures in reviewed spend shapes (P2PK scriptSig, P2WPKH witness); NULLFAIL is described, not executed, and the site never signs. |
| SegWit BIPs 141, 143 | BIP 143’s native P2WPKH and P2SH-P2WPKH examples (both SIGHASH_ALL): transaction serialization, signing preimages and digests. | Byte layout, transaction IDs, weight and virtual-size arithmetic, and rejection of unsupported signature-hash modes. | Selected witness-v0 examples, not every signature-hash mode or full transaction validation. |
| Timelocks BIPs 65, 68, 112, 113 | All 51 one-input cases in the pinned Bitcoin Core locktime excerpt, plus field examples from BIPs 68, 143 and 174. | Synthetic height and MTP boundaries, sequence flags and units, opcode-check order and median computation. | Narrow opcode forms and supplied chain anchors; the site does not query the chain or establish live spendability. |
| PSBT BIPs 174 | All 20 invalid and 10 valid BIP 174 PSBTs and its published role trace, through combination and extraction. | Unknown-field preservation, combination order, rejection of different transactions, and fee arithmetic in the figures. | A replay of the supplied PSBT v0 workflow; no live signing or complete signer-policy validation. |
| BIP 370 BIPs 370 | All 24 invalid and 14 valid BIP 370 PSBTs, each invalid one rejected for the field its case names, and all ten lock-time vectors, including the one printed without a case line. | Hex and Base64 forms agree; the unsigned transaction and unique ID built from the version 2 fields (sequences and flags do not change the ID); value sizes of the new fields; Constructor and Signer flag rules for each sighash type. | Reads PSBT versions 0 and 2 only and builds unsigned transactions; it does not add inputs, sign, finalize or extract, and checks only the BIP 174 value formats its PSBT model knows. |
| Schnorr BIPs 340 | All 19 BIP 340 CSV vectors, with verification results cross-checked against noble; test-only signing reproduces vectors that supply secrets. | Curve and scalar boundaries, input lengths, changed messages and tagged hashes. | Verification demonstrations do not audit a signer’s randomness or nonce handling. |
| Taproot BIPs 341 | All seven BIP 341 scriptPubKey cases and seven key-path inputs: tree hashes, tweaks, keys, control blocks, signature messages and signatures. | Changed leaves, control-block parity and length, sibling ordering, and signature-hash boundaries. | Wallet construction and key-path checks; arbitrary script execution belongs to the separately scoped Tapscript recorder. |
| Tapscript BIPs 342 | Success and failure witnesses for six pinned Bitcoin Core script-assets cases, replayed through reviewed opcode traces. | Commitment failures, signature budgets, changed transactions, OP_SUCCESS decoding and unsupported-scope rejection. | A narrow trace recorder. The optional full Core-file sweep is skipped unless that pinned file is supplied; arbitrary scripts are not covered. |
| MuSig2 BIPs 327 | The eight BIP 327 JSON vector files, including error cases; aggregated signatures are checked with BIP 340 verification. | Key-order and coefficient checks, and rejection of reuse after the model wipes a secret nonce. | Public test sessions; no audit of a real signer’s nonce storage, randomness or coordination. |
| Descriptors BIPs 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386 | BIP 380 checksum and key-expression cases, and BIPs 381–386 valid script expansions and invalid descriptors. | Checksum substitutions, key types, context rules, hardened derivation and script-size boundaries. | Supported descriptor forms only. Miniscript and later extensions are outside scope; valid but unsupported forms raise scope errors. |
| Silent payments BIPs 352 | All 28 BIP 352 send-and-receive vector cases, including labelled outputs and input eligibility. | Malformed addresses, compressed-key rules, scanning eligibility and output-search limits. | Supplied transaction examples and labels; no continuous blockchain scanning or live wallet recovery. |
| Message signing BIPs 322 | BIP 322 basic and generated vectors: message and virtual-transaction hashes, every simple and full signature case, and published error cases. | Reviewed interpreter rules, changed messages and addresses, commitment checks and unsupported spend shapes. | A partial verifier: committed scripts or spend shapes outside its reviewed set and proof-of-funds PSBTs can be inconclusive; earlier invalidity still takes precedence. |
| Block filters BIPs 157, 158 | All ten BIP 158 testnet block filters and headers, rebuilt from blocks and supplied spent-output scripts; its Golomb-Rice examples and a SipHash reference vector. | Encoding round trips, duplicate removal, empty filters, included-item matches and non-member searches. | Spent-output scripts come from vectors. The wallet workflow and false-positive branch are schematic; match and miss use tested probes. No BIP 157 peer exchange, chain validation or proof that a remote filter is complete. |
| v2 transport BIPs 324 | All seven BIP 324 packet-encoding vectors: shared secrets, derived keys, framing and published ciphertext checks. | Encryption/decryption round trips, changed ciphertext, associated-data failures and rekeying boundaries. | Decoded peer X coordinates are supplied by the vectors; ElligatorSwift encoding and decoding are not implemented. No live peer handshake is tested. |
| Version bits BIPs 9, 8 | Parameters and recorded deployments from the pinned BIP 9 assignments table, cross-checked against BIPs 68 and 141; BIP 8 rules from its text. | Synthetic signalling periods exercise thresholds, timeout precedence, MUST_SIGNAL and minimum activation heights. | A rule simulation, not a replay of historical block headers or a live deployment monitor. |
The 23 chapters make 723 evidence claims. The build checks each supporting quote word for word at its cited source lines. It also checks that every paragraph cites a claim, that fixtures name their source, and that file hashes match. A matching quote shows what the source says. It does not prove that our own inference follows from it. Inferences are labelled in each chapter’s evidence list and still need review.
What has not
- Every chapter is hand-authored and has had one independent technical review. 18 chapters were revised afterwards and await a fresh review. None has formal sign-off yet.
- No automated writing pipeline is connected yet.
- The models are teaching models. They check structure and encodings against published vectors. They are not wallets, signers or full conformance suites. They say nothing about ownership, balance, or whether a payment is safe.
- No screen-reader session or accessibility audit has been performed beyond the checks recorded in the project.
Privacy
Pages load no third-party scripts, fonts or analytics. Figures run entirely in your browser and never send what you do in them anywhere. They accept no typed addresses, keys, recovery phrases or PSBTs. Nothing on this site signs or broadcasts a transaction.