BIP 0085
How can one backup create separate seeds for other wallets?
BIP 85 turns one BIP 32 root key into separate entropy for each wallet, key or password. A hardened path names each use, and HMAC-SHA512 keeps an output from leading back to the root.
Someone with several wallets faces a problem that BIP 85 starts from. One mnemonic cannot serve every wallet, because wallets follow incompatible standards. Sharing one seed between wallets is undesirable for security, and keeping many separate backups safe is hard.1
With BIP 85 the user keeps a single backup, a BIP 32 root key, and the software holding it derives separate entropy for each application. The receiving wallet uses that entropy the way it would use freshly generated randomness: as a BIP 39 mnemonic, a private key, an extended key or a password.23
Source details
This chapter is an independent explanation, not the proposal itself. Preamble fields are shown as the pinned files record them, without author e-mail addresses. Status is the proposal’s own field. It is not an endorsement or a sign of consensus.
BIP 85: Deterministic Entropy From BIP32 Keychains
- BIP
- 85
- Layer
- Applications
- Title
- Deterministic Entropy From BIP32 Keychains
- Authors
- Ethan Kosakovsky
Aneesh Karve - Status
- Deployed
- Type
- Informational
- Assigned
- 2020-03-20
- License
- BSD-2-Clause OR OPUBL-1.0
- Version
- 2.1.0
Fig. A19.1 One root, a separate output for each application
Static view: BIP 39, 12 English words, with what a leaked output reveals. With JavaScript you can choose among 7 applications.
BIP 39, 12 English words: m/83696968'/39'/0'/12'/0' gives k, HMAC-SHA512 gives 64 bytes, and the application reads bytes 1–16: entropy for 12 words. Output: girl mad pet …
Exact values
- Path
m/83696968'/39'/0'/12'/0'- Published root key
xprv9s21ZrQH143K2LBWUUQRFXhucrQqBpKdRRxNVq2zBqsx8HVqFk2uYo8kmbaLLHRdqtQpUm98uKfu3vca1LqdGhUtyoFnCNkfmXRyPXLjbKb- k, the private key at the path
836951a7929020f8b4456034267fdebc9091274a4e46677c7d4180ef0c0ecea7- HMAC-SHA512 output (64 bytes)
6250b68daf746d12a24d58b4787a714bf1b58d69e4c2a466276fb16fe93dc52b6fac6b756894072241447cad56f6405ee326dbb473d2f5e943543590082927c0- Output (BIP 39 mnemonic)
girl mad pet galaxy egg matter matrix prison refuse sense ordinary nose
BIP 85 line 194. The output, and every byte BIP 85 prints, equal the published vector at build time; k and the bytes the vector does not print are computed by the same tested model. Public test material: never use it for funds or passwords.
BIP 39, 24 English words: m/83696968'/39'/0'/24'/0' gives k, HMAC-SHA512 gives 64 bytes, and the application reads bytes 1–32: entropy for 24 words. Output: puppy ocean match …
Exact values
- Path
m/83696968'/39'/0'/24'/0'- Published root key
xprv9s21ZrQH143K2LBWUUQRFXhucrQqBpKdRRxNVq2zBqsx8HVqFk2uYo8kmbaLLHRdqtQpUm98uKfu3vca1LqdGhUtyoFnCNkfmXRyPXLjbKb- k, the private key at the path
ce7c1baeeed41814cac04b73d3f71f7973b645acaa4c71071db099c13bcb4438- HMAC-SHA512 output (64 bytes)
ae131e2312cdc61331542efe0d1077bac5ea803adf24b313a4f0e48e9c51f37f6f6bba7cc92a2d1f5954b4ba442510e1e2179ec5f2ca003169803cfcbcc8e9e8- Output (BIP 39 mnemonic)
puppy ocean match cereal symbol another shed magic wrap hammer bulb intact gadget divorce twin tonight reason outdoor destroy simple truth cigar social volcano
BIP 85 line 220. The output, and every byte BIP 85 prints, equal the published vector at build time; k and the bytes the vector does not print are computed by the same tested model. Public test material: never use it for funds or passwords.
HD-seed WIF: m/83696968'/2'/0' gives k, HMAC-SHA512 gives 64 bytes, and the application reads bytes 1–32: private key. Output: Kzyv4uF39d4Jrw2W…
Exact values
- Path
m/83696968'/2'/0'- Published root key
xprv9s21ZrQH143K2LBWUUQRFXhucrQqBpKdRRxNVq2zBqsx8HVqFk2uYo8kmbaLLHRdqtQpUm98uKfu3vca1LqdGhUtyoFnCNkfmXRyPXLjbKb- k, the private key at the path
61bb2b1567224dac8d2f12afe20ce3758331c5755d65b769aded342dbff90969- HMAC-SHA512 output (64 bytes)
7040bb53104f27367f317558e78a994ada7296c6fde36a364e5baf206e502bb1f988080b7dd814e7ae7d6d83edbb6689886a560e165f4a740877cdf3beecacf8- Output (WIF private key)
Kzyv4uF39d4Jrw2W7UryTHwZr1zQVNk4dAFyqE6BuMrMh1Za7uhp
BIP 85 line 244. The output, and every byte BIP 85 prints, equal the published vector at build time; k and the bytes the vector does not print are computed by the same tested model. Public test material: never use it for funds or passwords.
XPRV: m/83696968'/32'/0' gives k, HMAC-SHA512 gives 64 bytes, and the application reads bytes 1–32: chain code; bytes 33–64: private key. Output: xprv9s21ZrQH143K…
Exact values
- Path
m/83696968'/32'/0'- Published root key
xprv9s21ZrQH143K2LBWUUQRFXhucrQqBpKdRRxNVq2zBqsx8HVqFk2uYo8kmbaLLHRdqtQpUm98uKfu3vca1LqdGhUtyoFnCNkfmXRyPXLjbKb- k, the private key at the path
ff3d66d7e5d9cb72caa66e3e78d076c2b65d1dba631b1e7f5bb71deedc1d3783- HMAC-SHA512 output (64 bytes)
52405cd0dd21c5be78314a7c1a3c65ffd8d896536cc7dee3157db5824f0c92e2ead0b33988a616cf6a497f1c169d9e92562604e38305ccd3fc96f2252c177682- Output (extended private key)
xprv9s21ZrQH143K2srSbCSg4m4kLvPMzcWydgmKEnMmoZUurYuBuYG46c6P71UGXMzmriLzCCBvKQWBUv3vPB3m1SATMhp3uEjXHJ42jFg7myX
BIP 85 line 263. The output, and every byte BIP 85 prints, equal the published vector at build time; k and the bytes the vector does not print are computed by the same tested model. Public test material: never use it for funds or passwords.
HEX, 64 bytes: m/83696968'/128169'/64'/0' gives k, HMAC-SHA512 gives 64 bytes, and the application reads all 64 bytes: the hex output. Output: 492db4698cf3b73a…
Exact values
- Path
m/83696968'/128169'/64'/0'- Published root key
xprv9s21ZrQH143K2LBWUUQRFXhucrQqBpKdRRxNVq2zBqsx8HVqFk2uYo8kmbaLLHRdqtQpUm98uKfu3vca1LqdGhUtyoFnCNkfmXRyPXLjbKb- k, the private key at the path
99a4262eb2fc7923d2d78790023e5d5ea44e897421a9eae069579a393d2f9453- HMAC-SHA512 output (64 bytes)
492db4698cf3b73a5a24998aa3e9d7fa96275d85724a91e71aa2d645442f878555d078fd1f1f67e368976f04137b1f7a0d19232136ca50c44614af72b5582a5c- Output (hex string)
492db4698cf3b73a5a24998aa3e9d7fa96275d85724a91e71aa2d645442f878555d078fd1f1f67e368976f04137b1f7a0d19232136ca50c44614af72b5582a5c
BIP 85 line 280. The output, and every byte BIP 85 prints, equal the published vector at build time; k and the bytes the vector does not print are computed by the same tested model. Public test material: never use it for funds or passwords.
Password, 21 Base64 characters: m/83696968'/707764'/21'/0' gives k, HMAC-SHA512 gives 64 bytes, and the application reads bytes 1–16: Base64, cut to 21 characters. Output: dKLoepugzdVJvdL5…
Exact values
- Path
m/83696968'/707764'/21'/0'- Published root key
xprv9s21ZrQH143K2LBWUUQRFXhucrQqBpKdRRxNVq2zBqsx8HVqFk2uYo8kmbaLLHRdqtQpUm98uKfu3vca1LqdGhUtyoFnCNkfmXRyPXLjbKb- k, the private key at the path
ee8650a6eacf65c4caef263d175be4f8aeb88210ff5dab17d0a9b1bdf2fab9e8- HMAC-SHA512 output (64 bytes)
74a2e87a9ba0cdd549bdd2f9ea880d554c6c355b08ed25088cfa88f3f1c4f74632b652fd4a8f5fda43074c6f6964a3753b08bb5210c8f5e75c07a4c2a20bf6e9- Output (password)
dKLoepugzdVJvdL56ogNV
BIP 85 line 317. The output, and every byte BIP 85 prints, equal the published vector at build time; k and the bytes the vector does not print are computed by the same tested model. Public test material: never use it for funds or passwords.
Dice, 10 rolls of a 6-sided die: m/83696968'/89101'/6'/10'/0' gives k, HMAC-SHA512 gives 64 bytes, and the application reads all 64 bytes: seed of the DRNG. Output: 1,0,0,2,0,1,5,5,…
Exact values
- Path
m/83696968'/89101'/6'/10'/0'- Published root key
xprv9s21ZrQH143K2LBWUUQRFXhucrQqBpKdRRxNVq2zBqsx8HVqFk2uYo8kmbaLLHRdqtQpUm98uKfu3vca1LqdGhUtyoFnCNkfmXRyPXLjbKb- k, the private key at the path
109d855ba9cdc42c209b4795d3f45d544762257803c1096f68aad20a538297cb- HMAC-SHA512 output (64 bytes)
5e41f8f5d5d9ac09a20b8a5797a3172b28c806aead00d27e36609e2dd116a59176a738804236586f668da8a51b90c708a4226d7f92259c69f64c51124b6f6cd2- Output (dice rolls, zero-indexed)
1,0,0,2,0,1,5,5,2,4
BIP 85 line 421. The output, and every byte BIP 85 prints, equal the published vector at build time; k and the bytes the vector does not print are computed by the same tested model. Public test material: never use it for funds or passwords.
One path per application
Every BIP 85 path starts at the purpose 83696968'. The next level is the application number, then that application's own parameters and an index. Application numbers are meant to be meaningful, such as a BIP number or ASCII codes: 39' makes BIP 39 mnemonics, 32' extended keys. Read two digits at a time as ASCII codes, 83696968 itself spells SEED.91011
For a mnemonic, the parameters are a language and a word count. Twelve English words at the first index sit at m/83696968'/39'/0'/12'/0'; the next twelve sit at index 1'. Each level is hardened, as the apostrophes show.412
Fig. A19.2 Two paths, level by level
From a child key to entropy
Ordinary hardened BIP 32 derivation along the path gives a child private key, k. BIP 85 does not hand k to the application. It computes HMAC-SHA512 with the text bip-entropy-from-k as the key and k as the message, which gives 512 bits.45
The authors give three reasons for the extra step. It prevents leakage of the parent tree should k be compromised. Hardened derivation would prevent that, and the specification requires it. The authors cannot enforce it on implementations, so the HMAC makes the derived entropy hardened either way. The application wants entropy, not a key, so the child key has to be transformed. And it guards against side effects should k also be used for another purpose, such as a nonce. The application only ever sees the HMAC's output, never k.47
Each application SHOULD use only the bits it needs and drop the rest. Twelve words take the first 128 bits; twenty-four take the first 256.512
Fig. A19.3 From root key to twelve words
Start from the root key: the one backup.
Derive along m/83696968'/39'/0'/12'/0', hardened at every level, to the child key k.
HMAC-SHA512, keyed with the text bip-entropy-from-k, turns k into 64 bytes.
Keep the first 16 bytes, 128 bits, and drop the other 48.
BIP 39 turns those 128 bits into 12 words: girl mad pet …
Exact values
- k
836951a7929020f8b4456034267fdebc9091274a4e46677c7d4180ef0c0ecea7- All 64 bytes
6250b68daf746d12a24d58b4787a714bf1b58d69e4c2a466276fb16fe93dc52b6fac6b756894072241447cad56f6405ee326dbb473d2f5e943543590082927c0- The 16 bytes kept
6250b68daf746d12a24d58b4787a714b
Different uses for 64 bytes
Apart from their paths, applications differ only in what they do with their 64 bytes. The HD-seed WIF uses the first 256 bits as a private key, encoded as a compressed WIF. BIP 85 intends it as the hdseed of Bitcoin Core wallets. An extended private key takes the first 32 bytes as its chain code and the second 32 as its key. Depth, parent fingerprint and child number are set to zero. BIP 85 warns that this reverses BIP 32's order.1314
Some applications serve uses beyond wallets. HEX outputs 16 to 64 bytes. The Base64 password application encodes all 64 bytes and keeps the first 20 to 86 characters. Dice rolls, for PINs and other numeric secrets, read from BIP85-DRNG: a SHAKE256 stream seeded with the 64 bytes, for uses that need more input than that.15161718
Fig. A19.4 What each application reads
When a derived key is invalid, and how dice avoid bias
A private key made from the bytes can, with probability below 1 in 2^127, be zero or not below the curve order. Software should then fail, and the user moves on to the next index.19
A die with N sides needs ceil(log2 N) bits a roll. Each roll reads whole bytes from the DRNG, as many as those bits need, and keeps only their top ceil(log2 N) bits: for a six-sided die, one byte, of which the top three bits count. A trial that comes out N or more is skipped, and the next one read. BIP 85's six-sided vector rolls 1,0,0,2,0,1,5,5,2,4, zero-indexed.618
What the root still controls
Every output is computed from the root key and its path alone. Whoever holds the root can recompute every output, which is what makes one backup enough, provided the user also knows which application, index and length each wallet used. One output does not reveal k, the root, or the output of another path.78
The receiving wallet sees an ordinary mnemonic, key or password; nothing in it marks it as derived. BIP 85 does not care how the root itself was made, whether from a BIP 39 mnemonic or another scheme. It records that it is not backwards compatible with any other specification.32021
Every output in these figures comes from BIP 85's published root key. It is public test material: never use it, or anything derived from it, for funds or passwords.6
Why one shared mnemonic is not enough
The authors point out that some wallets may be inherently less secure, such as hot wallets on phones or Lightning nodes. A wallet that shares the main mnemonic exposes everything the mnemonic controls; a wallet with a derived mnemonic exposes only its own.822
BIP 85 (Ethan Kosakovsky and Aneesh Karve) was assigned in 2020 and is recorded as Deployed and Informational. The pinned text is version 2.1.0.23
Evidence
Each numbered marker in the text points here, and the ↩ links lead back to the text. Quotes are verbatim
from the BIP files at commit 3a10b5b, wiki markup
included. Links open the exact lines. Labels say what kind of statement each entry is: a rule, the
author’s rationale, history, a test vector, or our own inference.
-
↩ Author’s rationale The authors' starting point: one mnemonic backup cannot serve every wallet because standards are incompatible, sharing one seed across wallets is undesirable for security, and physically storing many seeds is difficult.
Quoted source text (1)
It is not possible to maintain one single (mnemonic) seed backup for all keychains used across various wallets because there are a variety of incompatible standards. Sharing of seeds across multiple wallets is not desirable for security reasons. Physical storage of multiple seeds is difficult depending on the security and redundancy required.
-
↩ Rule BIP 85 derives entropy from a BIP 32 keychain, to be fed into whatever method a target wallet uses to make its own mnemonic or root key.
Quoted source text (1)
this proposal provides a way to derive entropy from the keychain which can be fed into whatever method a wallet uses to derive the initial mnemonic seed or root key.
-
↩ a b Rule BIP 85 starts from a single BIP 32 master root key and does not care how that root was made, for example from a BIP 39 mnemonic or an Electrum-style mnemonic.
Quoted source text (2)
We assume a single BIP32 master root key. This specification is not concerned with how this was derived (e.g. directly or via a mnemonic scheme such as BIP39).
This specification relies on BIP32 but is agnostic to how the BIP32 root key is derived. As such, this standard is able to derive wallets with initialization schemes like BIP39 or Electrum wallet style mnemonics.
-
↩ a b c d e Rule Each application gets a unique private key k, derived from the root along a fully hardened path; k then goes through HMAC-SHA512 with the key bip-entropy-from-k and k as the message.
Quoted source text (1)
For each application that requires its own wallet, a unique private key is derived from the BIP32 master root key using a fully hardened derivation path. The resulting private key (k) is then processed with HMAC-SHA512, where the key is "bip-entropy-from-k", and the message payload is the private key k:
-
↩ a b c Rule The HMAC gives 512 bits; each application SHOULD use only the bits it needs and truncate the rest.
Quoted source text (1)
The result produces 512 bits of entropy. Each application SHOULD use up to the required number of bits necessary for their operation, and truncate the rest.
-
↩ a b c d e Test vector The model reproduces BIP 85's published vectors from the published root key: test cases 1 and 2, the DRNG bytes, 12, 18 and 24 words, the WIF, XPRV, HEX, Base64 password and dice outputs; the build checks every vector it draws.
BIP 85 L64 BIP 85 L198 BIP 85 L424
Quoted source text (3)
===Test vectors===
DERIVED BIP39 MNEMONIC=girl mad pet galaxy egg matter matrix prison refuse sense ordinary nose
DERIVED ROLLS=1,0,0,2,0,1,5,5,2,4
-
↩ a b c Author’s rationale The authors give three reasons for HMAC-SHA512: to prevent leakage of the parent tree should k be compromised, since hardened derivation is required but the authors cannot enforce it, so the HMAC makes the entropy hardened regardless; the purpose is entropy, not a private key, so the child key must be transformed; and, out of caution, to avoid unwanted interactions should k be used for a dual purpose, such as a nonce.
Quoted source text (1)
The reason for running the derived key through HMAC-SHA512 and truncating the result as necessary is to prevent leakage of the parent tree should the derived key (''k'') be compromised. While the specification requires the use of hardened key derivation which would prevent this, we cannot enforce hardened derivation, so this method ensures the derived entropy is hardened. Also, from a semantic point of view, since the purpose is to derive entropy and not a private key, we are required to transform the child key. This is done out of an abundance of caution, in order to ward off unwanted side effects should ''k'' be used for a dual purpose, including as a nonce ''hash(k)'', where undesirable and unforeseen interactions could occur.
-
↩ a b c Editorial inference Every output is computed from the root key and its path alone, so whoever holds the root can recompute every output, while one output does not give k, the root or another path's output. This follows from the derivation and the authors' rationale; BIP 85 does not state it in these words.
Quoted source text (2)
a unique private key is derived from the BIP32 master root key using a fully hardened derivation path.
to prevent leakage of the parent tree should the derived key (''k'') be compromised.
-
↩ a b Rule BIP 85 paths have the form m/83696968'/{app_no}'/{index}', with the application's number after the purpose and an index last.
Quoted source text (1)
Derivation paths follow the format <code>m/83696968'/{app_no}'/{index}'</code>, where ''{app_no}'' is the path for the application, and ''{index}'' is the index.
-
↩ Rule Application numbers should be semantic, such as a BIP number or a sequence of ASCII character codes.
Quoted source text (1)
Application numbers should be semantic in some way, such as a BIP number or ASCII character code sequence.
-
↩ a b Editorial inference Read two digits at a time as ASCII codes, the purpose number 83696968 spells SEED (83 S, 69 E, 69 E, 68 D). BIP 85 does not say so; this is our reading, checked by a test.
Quoted source text (2)
m/83696968'/{app_no}'/{index}'
such as a BIP number or ASCII character code sequence.
-
↩ a b c d Rule Application 39' makes BIP 39 mnemonics on the path m/83696968'/39'/{language}'/{words}'/{index}', keeping 128 bits for 12 words and 256 bits for 24; the next twelve words for the same language sit at index 1'.
BIP 85 L113 BIP 85 L115 BIP 85 L117 BIP 85 L119
Quoted source text (4)
Application number: 39'
Truncate trailing (least significant) bytes of the entropy to the number of bits required to map to the relevant word length: 128 bits for 12 words, 256 bits for 24 words.
The derivation path format is: <code>m/83696968'/39'/{language}'/{words}'/{index}'</code>
a BIP39 mnemonic with 12 English words (first index) would have the path <code>m/83696968'/39'/0'/12'/0'</code>, the next key would be <code>m/83696968'/39'/0'/12'/1'</code> etc.
-
↩ a b c Rule Application 2' uses the most significant 256 bits as a private key, encoded as a compressed WIF that BIP 85 says will be used as the hdseed for Bitcoin Core wallets.
BIP 85 L227 BIP 85 L229 BIP 85 L237–238
Quoted source text (3)
Application number: 2'
Uses the most significant 256 bits
of entropy as the secret exponent to derive a private key and encode as a compressed WIF that will be used as the hdseed for Bitcoin Core wallets.
-
↩ a b Rule Application 32' makes an extended private key: the first 32 bytes are the chain code and the second 32 the private key, with child number, depth and parent fingerprint zero. BIP 85 warns that this reverses BIP 32's order.
BIP 85 L251 BIP 85 L253 BIP 85 L255
Quoted source text (3)
Application number: 32'
the first 32 bytes are the chain code, and the second 32 bytes<ref name="curve-order" /> are the private key for the BIP32 XPRV value. Child number, depth, and parent fingerprint are forced to zero.
''Warning'': The above order reverses the order of BIP32, which takes the first 32 bytes as the private key, and the second 32 bytes as the chain code.
-
↩ a b Rule Application 128169' outputs 16 to 64 bytes as hex, the rest truncated.
Quoted source text (2)
Application number: 128169'
`16 <= num_bytes <= 64` Truncate trailing (least significant) bytes of the entropy after `num_bytes`.
-
↩ a b Rule Application 707764' Base64-encodes all 64 bytes and keeps the first 20 to 86 characters as a password.
Quoted source text (2)
Application number: 707764'
`20 <= pwd_len <= 86` [https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4648 Base64] encode all 64 bytes of entropy. Remove any spaces or new lines inserted by Base64 encoding process. Slice Base64 result string on index 0 to `pwd_len`. This slice is the password.
-
↩ Rule BIP85-DRNG seeds a SHAKE256 stream with exactly the 64 bytes, for uses that need more than 64 bytes of input.
Quoted source text (1)
BIP85-DRNG-SHAKE256 is a deterministic random number generator for cryptographic functions that require deterministic outputs, but where the input to that function requires more than the 64 bytes provided by BIP85's HMAC output. BIP85-DRNG-SHAKE256 uses BIP85 to seed a SHAKE256 stream (from the SHA-3 standard). The input must be exactly 64 bytes long (from the BIP85 HMAC output).
-
↩ a b c Rule Application 89101' rolls an N-sided die for PINs and other numeric secrets: rolls are zero-indexed; each trial reads ceil(ceil(log2 N) / 8) whole bytes from the DRNG and keeps their most significant ceil(log2 N) bits; a trial that is not below N is skipped.
BIP 85 L393 BIP 85 L400 BIP 85 L403–404 BIP 85 L406 BIP 85 L410–415 BIP 85 L416–417
Quoted source text (6)
Application number: 89101'
Use this application to generate PIN numbers, numeric secrets, and secrets over custom alphabets.
Roll values are zero-indexed, such that an N-sided die produces values in the range <code>[0, N-1]</code>, inclusive.
Create a BIP85 DRNG whose seed is the derived entropy.
bits_per_roll = ceil(log_2(sides)) bytes_per_roll = ceil(bits_per_roll / 8) Read <code>bytes_per_roll</code> bytes from the DRNG. Trim any bits in excess of <code>bits_per_roll</code> (retain the most significant bits). The resulting integer represents a single roll or trial.
If the trial is greater than or equal to the number of sides, skip it and move on to the next one.
-
↩ Rule A derived key can, with probability below 1 in 2^127, be zero or not below the curve order; software should then fail hard, and the user moves to the next index.
Quoted source text (2)
should hard fail (forcing users to iterate to the next index).
(Note: this has probability lower than 1 in 2127.)
-
↩ Editorial inference A derived mnemonic, WIF key or extended key is an ordinary one: the receiving wallet uses it as it would any other, and nothing in it records that it was derived. This follows from BIP 85's outputs being standard encodings; BIP 85 does not say it in these words.
Quoted source text (2)
can be fed into whatever method a wallet uses to derive the initial mnemonic seed or root key.
encode as a compressed WIF that will be used as the hdseed for Bitcoin Core wallets.
-
↩ Rule BIP 85 records that it is not backwards compatible with any other existing specification.
Quoted source text (1)
This specification is not backwards compatible with any other existing specification.
-
↩ Author’s rationale The authors note that some wallets may be inherently less secure, such as hot wallets on smartphones or Lightning Network nodes, so sharing one mnemonic with them is unsatisfactory.
Quoted source text (1)
Neither scenario is particularly satisfactory for security reasons. For example, some wallets may be inherently less secure, like hot wallets on smartphones, JoinMarket servers, or Lightning Network nodes.
-
↩ History BIP 85 (Kosakovsky, Karve), Deterministic Entropy From BIP32 Keychains, was assigned in 2020 and is recorded as Deployed and Informational, at version 2.1.0.
Quoted source text (2)
Title: Deterministic Entropy From BIP32 Keychains Authors: Ethan Kosakovsky <ethankosakovsky@protonmail.com> Aneesh Karve <dowsing.seaport0d@icloud.com> Status: Deployed Type: Informational Assigned: 2020-03-20
Version: 2.1.0